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Do You Trust to Get Trust? A Study of Trust Reciprocity Behaviors and
Reciprocal Trust Prediction
Viet-An Nguyen, Ee-Peng Lim, Hwee-Hoon Tan, Jing Jiang∗ Aixin Sun†
Abstract
Trust reciprocity, a special form of link reciprocity, exists
in many networks of trust among users. In this paper,
we seek to determine the extent to which reciprocity exists
in a trust network and develop quantitative models for
measuring reciprocity and reciprocity related behaviors. We
identify several reciprocity behaviors and their respective
measures. These behavior measures can be employed for
predicting if a trustee will return trust to her trustor given
that the latter initiates a trust link earlier. We develop for
this reciprocal trust prediction task a number of ranking
method and classification methods, and evaluated them on
an Epinions trust network data. Our results show that
reciprocity related behaviors provide good features for both
ranking and classification based methods under different
parameter settings.
1 Introduction
Trust reciprocity refers to two users trusting each
other. This two-way trust usually represents a stronger
relationship between the connected users compared to
one-way trust. A user network with many two-way trust
links is likely to be more robust than that with few such
links. Such strong and stable trust relationships can also
be very useful in developing the next generation search
and recommendation applications that aim to provide
more personalized and accurate results [9].
Trust reciprocity can be caused by the mindset of:
“You scratch my back (trust me), and I will do the same
on yours (trust you back)”. A trustor may trust some-
one hoping to gain trust in return. A trustee returns
trust to her trustor to show appreciation at the same
time expanding the trustee’s web of trust. The above
mindset (e.g., exchanging gifts among friends, return-
ing favors, etc.) exists in many different cultures and
leads to a range of trust reciprocity related behaviors.
In this paper, we specifically study four interesting trust
reciprocity related behaviors: A user who initiates trust
with many other users in an non-discriminative manner
is said to demonstrate the trust initiating (I) behav-
∗Singapore Management University.
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ior. A user who returns trust to anyone who trusts them
is said to demonstrate the trust returning (R) behav-
ior. A user who gains trust from many others without
having to initiate trust earlier is said to demonstrate the
trust attracting (A) behavior. Finally, a user who
can get trustees to trust her back is said to demonstrate
the successful trust seeking (S) behavior.
1.1 Research Objectives In this paper, we study
the phenomenon of trust reciprocity and the above four
reciprocity related behaviors. We also aim to show that
such behaviors can be effectively used to predict trust
links among users. To study trust reciprocity related
behaviors, we introduce several models to measure be-
haviors. To predict trust links using behaviors, we in-
troduce the reciprocal trust prediction task and develop
prediction methods using features derived from reci-
procity related behaviors. This research is conducted
on a publicly available real dataset from Epinions pro-
viding us the empirical evidence of trust reciprocity as
well as the data for the behavior study and prediction
task.
We now summarize our contributions as follows:
• We measure trust reciprocity using link reci-
procity which has been studied in the context of
Web network, email networks, word networks, food
networks, etc. [2]. The previously proposed link
reciprocity is a global measure as it calibrates
reciprocity for a given network. We develop a
new user reciprocity measures to determine the
users with high reciprocity. We show that both
global and user trust reciprocities exist in our Epin-
ions trust network data (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
• We then develop three models for the four types
of trust reciprocity related behaviors. Each model
allows us to quantitatively assign values to each
user behavior based on a set of principles. This
is the first attempt the trust reciprocity related
behaviors (i.e., I, R, S and A behaviors) and their
measures are systemically studied. We believe this
opens a new data mining research direction for
trust reciprocity related behaviors.
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• To illustrate the usefulness of trust reciprocity re-
lated behaviors, we consider them in the recip-
rocal trust prediction task. In reciprocal trust
prediction, we determine the likelihood of having a
trustee return trust to his/her trustor. Reciprocal
trust prediction is useful in trust recommendation
applications that prioritize trust links with other
users when prior trust links from these users exist,
and trust links with other users with the motive to
get returning links from them. Both unsupervised
(i.e., ranking) and supervised (i.e., classification)
methods of reciprocal trust prediction have been
proposed. Our experiments on the Epinions trust
network show that the both unsupervised (i.e., Ba-
sicRank, DelayRank, ReputationRank) and
supervised methods using trust reciprocity related
behavior measures (i.e., SVMBasic, SVMDelay,
SVMReputation, and SVMAll) perform well in
this task compared with trust prediction method
using topological features. This suggests that reci-
procity related behaviors play an important role in
trust prediction.
1.2 Epinions Dataset We conduct this research on
a real dataset that consists of trust statements (or trust
links) of Epinions users from 17 January 2001 to 12
August 2003 (938 days). In Epinions, users write re-
views on products and the reviews can be rated or com-
mented by other users. These user generated content
serves as useful reference for users comparing and eval-
uating products. In addition, Epinions users can spec-
ify other users they trust using trust statements. Each
trust statement represents a trustor conferring trust on
a trustee and is assigned a timestamp. We use z = 1 to
938 to denote the timestamps of trust statements from
17 January 2001 to 12 August 2003 respectively. The
dataset also consists of a set of non-timestamped trust
statements that exist prior to 17 January 2001. We use
z = 0 to cover this time period.
Table 1 shows the main statistics of this dataset.
It shows that about 34,355114,222 or 30% of users who have
trust links also have reciprocal trust links. 172,244506,934 or
about 34% of non-timestamped trust statements (i.e., at
z = 0) are reciprocal links. This proportion is similar for
the combined non-timestamped and timestamped trust
statements from z = 0 to 938 which has 249,076506,934+210,195
or 35% reciprocal links. Both the user and trust
reciprocal link proportions indicate that high degree of
trust reciprocity exists in the trust network.
1.3 Paper Outline For the rest of the paper, we first
review the related work in Section 2. We then present
the existing network level reciprocity measures and a
Table 1: Statistics of Epinions Dataset
Description Number
|U| = # users with trust links 114,222
|U↔| = # users with reciprocal trust links 34,355
|T0| = # trust links for z = 0 506,934
|T[1,938]| = # trust links for z ∈ [1, 938] 210,195
|Tall| = |T0 ∪T[1,938]| 717,129
|T↔0| = # reciprocal trust links for z = 0 172,244
|T↔938| = # reciprocal trust links up to z = 938 249,076
(including z = 0)
new user level reciprocity measure in Section 3. Our
proposed trust reciprocity related user behavior models
and their empirical evaluation results are covered in Sec-
tions 4 and 5 respectively. Reciprocal trust prediction
and our proposed solution methods using reciprocity re-
lated behaviors are given in Section 6. Section 7 shows
the results of the various prediction methods. We finally
conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 Related Work
As will be mentioned in Section 3, link reciprocity in
graphs have been studied in [2, 11]. These earlier
works are very different from ours in that: (a) we study
reciprocity mainly at the user level; and (b) we focus
on modeling reciprocity related user behaviors from the
timestamped trust links. Furthermore, we have applied
these user level reciprocity behavior models to reciprocal
trust prediction.
Reciprocal trust prediction is a special kind of trust
prediction task and the latter has been studied in sev-
eral previous papers. Trust prediction can be ad-
dressed by non-supervised and supervised techniques.
The non-supervised techniques include those based on
node proximity and attribute similarity between can-
didate trustors and trustees [6, 12], and those based
on propagating trust weights [4] (e.g., Moletrust [8] and
Tidaltrust [3]). The supervised techniques require train-
ing data for constructing prediction models [7, 10]. Fea-
tures are first defined for representing candidate trustor-
trustee pairs before the prediction models are trained
using labeled trustor-trustee pairs. Finally, the learnt
prediction models are required to classify unlabeled user
pairs.
Reciprocal trust prediction is different in that it
requires a user to first initiate trust link to another user
whereas general trust prediction predicts trust between
two users without such an initiating link condition. The
latter is obviously a harder problem. Nevertheless,
solving the reciprocal trust prediction can potentially
help to improve the accuracy of general trust prediction.
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3 Reciprocity in Directed Networks
3.1 Notations Before we discuss further in trust
reciprocity, we first list the notations to be used in our
subsequent discussion. They are:
• U[z]: a set of users involved in some trust link(s)
up to time z
• Ui∗[z]: Set of users to whom ui creates trust links
up to time z
• U∗i[z]: Set of users who create trust links to ui up
to the time z
• Ui[z] (= Ui∗[z]∪U∗i[z]): Set of users having trust
links with ui up to the time z
• UIi∗[z]: Set of users to whom ui initiates trust links
up to time z. (UIi∗[z] ⊆ Ui∗[z])
• UI∗i[z]: Set of users who initiate trust links to ui
up to time z. (UI∗i[z] ⊆ U∗i[z])
• zij : The time stamp when ui creates a trust link to
uj
To keep discussion simple without causing any
confusion, z may be omitted from all the notations
(except zij).
3.2 Global Reciprocity Our research starts by ex-
amining the extent of reciprocity in a trust network.
A trust network is essentially a directed network with
users as nodes and trust from a trustor ui to a trustee
uj represented by an edge (ui, uj). In [11], the link reci-
procity rg of a directed graph is defined by:
rg =
|T↔|
|T|(3.1)
where T↔ and T refer to the set of reciprocity links and
the set of all links respectively. The subscript g in the
notation distinguishes the above measure from the user
reciprocity measure. When using trust links up to time
z to derive rg, we denote it by rg[z].
Figure 1 depicts the rg at daily interval accumu-
lating the trust links in our Epinions data from z = 0
to 938. Throughout the entire time period, rg varies
between a narrow range between [0.335 and 0.35] sug-
gesting that the global reciprocity remains rather stable
throughout. Incidentally, this global reciprocity value of
Epinions trust network is similar to that of Wikipedia
which consists of articles linking to one another [13].
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Figure 1: Global reciprocity rg from z = 0 to 938
3.3 User Reciprocity The global link reciprocity rg
is a measure for the entire graph and does not allow us to
identify the users involved in reciprocity. Such users are
the ones with high reciprocity in their neighborhoods.
We therefore define a new user reciprocity measures rui
for user ui as follows:
rui =
|Ui∗ ∩U∗i|
|Ui|(3.2)
The rui measure, with a value in [0,1], denotes the
ratio of the number of bi-directional neighbors to the
total number of neighbors of user ui. For users with
|Ui| = 0, we assign 0 to rui .
Figure 2 depicts the average, median and 75 per-
centile of {rui}’s at daily interval accumulating the trust
links in the dataset from z = 0 to 938. Note that the
maximum rui among the Epinions users is 1 through-
out the period and we do not show them in the figure.
This suggests that there exists a very small proportion
of users enjoying very high reciprocity with their neigh-
bors. We observe that the average and median user
reciprocity change very little. Due to many users hav-
ing zero rui values, the lower 50 percentile values are
zeros. The 75 percentile curve shows that the higher
user reciprocity values converge more towards average
over time. This means that users from 50 to 70 per-
centiles have less than 20% neighbors linking back.
4 Reciprocity Related User Behavior Models
In this section, we design quantitative models for user
behaviors related to trust reciprocity. The reciprocity
measures in Section 3 allow us to measure the amount of
reciprocity links in a given trust network falling short of
giving an explanation of how the reciprocity is formed.
This part of the research thus aims to explain reciprocity
by investigating the following user behaviors.
• Trust initiating (I) behavior: This behavior
refers to how active a user is engaged in initiating
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Figure 2: User reciprocity rui ’s from z = 0 to 938
trust links with other users. By initiating many
trust links, one may maximize the growth of her
trust links and the number of her trustees returning
trust.
• Trust successful seeking (S) behavior: This
behavior refers to how successful or easy a user gets
returning trust links from users she earlier initiates
trust links with. Successful seeking behavior, unlike
initiating behavior, is concerned with the likelihood
of returning trust. Hence, a high trust initiating
user may not be successful in seeking returning
trust. On the other hand, a highly successful user
in seeking returning trust may not initiate many
trust.
• Trust attracting (A) behavior: This behavior
refers to how good a user is at getting trust links
initiated from others. The trust attracting behav-
ior is very much the opposite of trust initiating be-
havior. For one reason or another (e.g., reputation,
review writing with strong opinions), some users
may tend to attract trust links initiated by others.
• Trust returning (R) behavior: This behavior
refers to the tendency of a user returning trust
to others. Similar to initiating behavior, trust
returning behavior can allow a user to grow trust
links quickly. It is however different from initiating
behavior by considering only return trust links. A
high trust returning user may not have high trust
attracting behavior. A high trust attracting user
also may not return many trust links.
The above behaviors are different from global and
user reciprocity measures as these behaviors divide trust
links into initiating and returning links. This is only
possible by exploiting the timestamps (ie., zij ’s) of trust
links. We now propose different quantitative models
for the above behaviors based on different underlying
principles.
4.1 Basic Behavior Models A straightforward ap-
proach to model I, S, A and R behaviors is to consider
the sets of initiating and returning trust links. The set
notations used have been defined in Section 3.1. A trust
link from ui to uj is said to be initiating if no prior trust
link exist between them. A trust link uj to ui is said
to be returning if the trust link ui to uj exists before-
hand. Given a time point z, the basic reciprocity related
behaviors of user ui are defined as follows:
• Initiating: Proportion of ui initiated trust links
among trust links from ui.
Ii[z] =
|UIi∗[z]|
|Ui∗[z]|(4.3)
• Attracting: Proportion of incoming trust links to
ui that are initiated by others.
Ai[z] =
|UI∗i[z]|
|U∗i[z]|(4.4)
• Successful seeking: Proportion of ui initiated trust
links that are returned.
Si[z] =
|UIi∗[z] ∩U∗i[z]|
|UIi∗[z]|
(4.5)
• Returning: Proportion of trust links to ui initiated
by others that are returned by ui.
Ri[z] =
|UI∗i[z] ∩Ui∗[z]|
|UI∗i[z]|
(4.6)
4.2 Delay-Aware Models The delay-aware models,
unlike the basic ones, consider a non-initiating trust
link from ui to uj to be returning depending on how
soon the link is created after the trust link from uj to
ui. A decay function is defined to assign a returning
weight wij to the link from ui to uj as shown in
Equation 4.7. Every initiating trust link is assigned
a zero returning weight. A non-initiating trust link
is assigned high returning weight when it is created
soon after a corresponding initiating trust link. The
weight reduces as the time delay between initiating
and returning links enlarges. This weighting scheme
is designed to treat a long overdue returning link as an
initiating link.
We define a returning weight wij in [0,1] for a trust
link from ui to uj as follows:
wij [z] =
{ 1
1+α·(zij−zji) , if ui ∈ {UIj∗[z] ∩U∗j [z]};
0, otherwise.
(4.7)
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where α is in the form 1m and wij =
1
2 when zij is m
days later than zji. A small m will therefore increase
the decaying rate. In our experiments, we have used
α = 0.1 (or m = 10 days).
The delay-aware user behavior models are thus
defined as follows1:
• Initiating: This is defined by the average of the
inverse of returning weights of trust links from
ui among all trust links from ui. The inverse of
returning weight of a trust link tells how likely the
trust link is initiated from ui.
Idi [z] = Avg
uj∈Ui∗[z]
(1− wij [z])(4.8)
• Attracting: This is defined by the average of the
inverse of returning weights of trust links to ui
among all trust links to ui.
Adi [z] = Avg
uj∈U∗i[z]
(1− wji[z])(4.9)
• Successful seeking: This is defined by the average
of returning weights of trust links to ui from users
with whom ui has initiated trust links.
Sdi [z] = Avg
uj∈UIi∗[z]
wji[z](4.10)
• Returning: This is defined by the average of return-
ing weights of trust links from ui to users who have
initiated trust links with ui.
Rdi [z] = Avg
uj∈UI∗i[z]
wij [z](4.11)
4.3 Reputation-Aware Models So far, we do not
distinguish users creating trust links seriously versus
other users creating trusts frivolously. Reputation-
aware model thus scrutinizes the reputation of users so
as to determine trust initiating, attracting, successful
seeking and returning behaviors that involve non-serious
trust links. For example, a user is considered active in
initiating trust links if most of the links involve trustees
who are perceived to be less reputable than him.
The reputation of a user uj perceived by user
ui at time z is denoted by tij [z]. We determine the
absolute reputation of a user uj by |U∗j |, the number of
incoming trust links. The perceived reputation tij [z] is
thus determined by the positive difference in reputation
∆ij [z] = |U∗j [z]| − |U∗i[z]|. To keep this value in the
1The superscript d used for the behavior notations denotes
delay-aware model.
range [0, 1] we define the normalized reputation of uj
perceived by ui at time z as follows:
tij [z] =
∆ij [z]−mini′j′{∆i′j′ [z]}
maxi′j′{∆i′j′ [z]} −mini′j′{∆i′j′ [z]}(4.12)
The reputation-aware user behavior model thus
extends the basic model as follows2:
• Initiating: This is defined by the weighted propor-
tion of ui initiated trust links among trust links
from ui with weights determined by the inverse per-
ceived reputation of the trustees by ui at the times
the links were initiated by ui.
Iri [z] =
1
|Ui∗[z]| ·
∑
uj∈UIi∗[z]
(1− tij [zij ])(4.13)
• Attracting: This is defined by the weighted propor-
tion of ui incoming trust links initiated by other
trustors among all the incoming links to ui. The
weights are the inverse perceived reputations of ui
by the trustors at the times the incoming links were
created.
Ari [z] =
1
|U∗i[z]| ·
∑
uj∈UI∗i[z]
(1− tji[zji])(4.14)
• Successful seeking: This is defined by the weighted
proportion of returning trust links to ui among the
trust links initiated by ui. The weights are the
inverse perceived reputations of ui by the users
returning the trust links at the times the returning
links were created.
Sri [z] =
1
|UIi∗[z]|
·
∑
uj∈UIi∗[z]∩U∗i[z]
(1−tji[zji])(4.15)
• Returning: This is defined by the weighted propor-
tion of the returning trust links from ui among the
trust links initiated by other users. The weights
are the inverse perceived reputations of these other
users by ui at the time the returning trust links
were created.
Rri [z] =
1
|UI∗i[z]|
·
∑
uj∈UI∗i[z]∩Ui∗[z]
(1−tij [zij ])(4.16)
2The superscript r used for the behavior notations denotes
reputation-aware model.
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Figure 3: Reciprocal Delay Distribution
5 Empirical Results of Reciprocity Related
Behaviors
In this section, we show the distribution of reciprocal
delay of users and difference in indegree of trust user
pairs in the Epinions dataset. They are used in the
Delay-Aware and Reputation-Aware Behavior Models.
We also give an empirical comparison of our proposed
behavior models.
5.1 Reciprocal Delay Figure 3 shows the distribu-
tion of delay for user pairs with reciprocal trust links
(34,910 of them) which follows power law. Among the
pairs, 9445 have zero delay, i.e., they form bi-directional
links on the same day. The maximum, 75 percentile,
and median delays are 913, 23, and 2 days respectively.
This shows that most delays in returning links are small.
There are however some returning links that have large
delays which may not necessary be treated as responses
to the corresponding initiating links. The Delay-Aware
Model will see them more as non-returning links.
5.2 Difference in Indegree The perceived reputa-
tion of uj by ui, tij , is measured by the indegree differ-
ence between uj and ui, (|U∗j |− |U∗i|). In our dataset,
there are 114,222 users with trust links. We first show a
distribution of indegree of these users in Figure 4. This
distribution follows power law.
Figure 5 shows the indegree difference distribution
for initiating trust links, returning trust links and
any trust links. Each trust link involves a user pair.
The y-axis show the number of trust links in log
scale. The distribution shows that there are many users
initiating and returning trust links to others having
lower reputations (with -ve indegree differences). The
number of initiating trust links for different indegree
difference represented by cross symbol peaks at zero.
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Figure 4: Indegree Distribution
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Figure 5: Indegree Difference Distribution
The same can be said for returning links represented
by circles. The figure shows that the number of
initiating trust links for positive indegree differences
is larger than that for negative indegree differences
of the same magnitude. On the other hand, the
number of returning trust links for positive indegree
differences is smaller than that for negative indegree
differences of the same magnitude. This is reasonable
since the corresponding initiating links are likely to
have postive indegree differences. Since there are many
more initiating links than returning ones, the combined
distribution of both initiating and returning links is very
similar to that of initiating links.
5.3 Comparison of Behavior Models To examine
the distributions of the different trust related behavior
values and user reciprocity over time, we show the
box-plots of behavior scores from z = 1 to 938 in
Figure 6. We only include users with at least 5
incoming trust links and 5 outgoing trust links to ensure
that the computed behavior values are meaningful.
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(b) Basic User Behaviors
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(c) Delay-Aware User Behav-
iors
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(d) Reputation-Aware User
Behaviors
Figure 6: Box Plots of Behavior Scores from z = 1 to
938
The figure shows that the medians, upper and lower
quartiles of behavior and user reciprocity values are
generally stable throughout consistent with the earlier
observation on user reciprocity (see Section 3.3). There
are few outlying values that vary across time.
Finally, we examine the correlations between user
behavior values and user reciprocity using Pearson Cor-
relation coefficient in the following tables. Only behav-
ior and user reciprocity values at z = 938 are used and
the minimum 5 incoming and 5 outgoing trust links filter
still applies. As shown in these tables, Basic and Delay-
Aware models are very strongly correlated across all the
4 behaviors. Reputation-Aware model is strongly corre-
lated with Basic and Delay-Aware models in Initiating,
Successful Seeking and Returning behaviors but not At-
tracting behavior. We notice that attracting scores have
be affected much by uneven distribution of perceived
reputation of incoming links among different users. This
results in most attracting values of Reputation-Aware
model concentrate in a narrow band and are less con-
sistent with those generated by other behavior models.
The user reciprocity values are not strongly corre-
lated with most our proposed behavior models for most
trust reciprocity related behaviors except the returning
behavior. This suggests that users with high reciprocity
are more to depend on their good returning behavior
than successful seeking behavior to achieve good reci-
procity with neighbors.
Table 2: Initiating scores
User Rec. Basic Delay-Aware Rep.-Aware
User Rec 1.0000 -0.6108 -0.6428 -0.6138
Basic - 1.0000 0.9014 0.9812
Delay-Aware - - 1.0000 0.8958
Rep.Aware - - - 1.0000
Table 3: Seeking scores
User Rec. Basic Delay-Aware Rep.-Aware
User Rec 1.0000 0.6361 0.6236 0.6471
Basic - 1.0000 0.9427 0.9962
Delay-Aware - - 1.0000 0.9386
Rep.-Aware - - - 1.0000
6 Reciprocal Trust Prediction Problem
6.1 Problem Statement To study how the known
reciprocity user behaviors affect trust link creation, we
now explore the use of these behaviors in the reciprocal
trust prediction problem. In this problem, we
predict if a returning trust link from uj to ui will be
created at zji ≥ T for an initiating link with zij =
T . Reciprocal trust prediction is useful when one is
interested to know if an initiating trust link will be
returned in the future. This therefore helps one to select
the users to trust.
Reciprocal trust prediction is a variant of link
prediction problem that has not be studied before. In
the following, we describe several solution methods that
are broadly classified into ranking and classification
approaches. The former uses reciprocity related user
behaviors directly to score the likelihood of returning
trust links. The latter uses all the reciprocity related
user behaviors as features in training a classifier for
predicting returning trust links.
6.2 Ranking Approach The ranking approach is
non-supervised and requires a scoring function that
derives a score for a returning link given each initiating
trust link. Suppose ui has already initiated a trust to
uj . We want to predict if uj returns another trust to ui.
Among the four different user behaviors (i.e., initiating
(I), attracting (A), successful seeking (S) and returning
(R)), the combinations that involves ui’s successful
seeking and uj ’s returning are most relevant. We expect
ui who is high in successful seeking can solicit returning
trust more easily than those with low successful seeking
Table 4: Attracting scores
User Rec. Basic Delay-Aware Rep.-Aware
User Rec 1.0000 -0.4673 -0.4194 0.2549
Basic - 1.0000 0.9490 -0.3681
Delay-Aware - - 1.0000 -0.3438
Rep.-Aware - - - 1.0000
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Table 5: Returning scores
User Rec. Basic Delay-Aware Rep.-Aware
User Rec 1.0000 0.8213 0.7624 0.8190
Basic - 1.0000 0.9491 0.9986
Delay-Aware - - 1.0000 0.9475
Rep.Aware - - - 1.0000
behavior. Similarly, uj with high returning behaviors
is also more likely to return trust links. Initiating and
attracting behaviors, on the other hand, have no direct
relevance in reciprocal trust prediction.
In this paper, we therefore confine ourselves to
the three combinations of successful seeking and re-
turning behaviors derived by the basic, delay-aware
and reputation-aware models, namely BasicRank, De-
layRank and ReputationRank. Each method as-
signs a score score(i, j) representing the likelihood of a
returning trust link given an initiating link from ui to
uj as follows:
• BasicRank Method: scores(i, j) = Si[zij ] ·Rj [zij ]
• DelayRank Method: scored(i, j) = Sdi [zij ] ·
Rdj [zij ]
• ReputationRankMethod: scorer(i, j) = Sri [zij ] ·
Rrj [zij ]
Based on user reciprocity, we also propose a ranking
method based on the assumption that two users with
neighborhood of high reciprocity are more likely to
return a trust link.
• UserReciprocityRank Method: scoreu(i, j) =
rui [zij ] · ruj [zij ]
Once a score is assigned to each initiating trust link,
we can rank all initiating trust links by score and predict
the top ones as the ones with highest likelihood to have
returning trust links. The criteria used to select top
scores can be based on some pre-defined threshold or
expected fraction of returning links among initiating
links.
6.3 Classification Approach The classification ap-
proach is supervised and it trains a classifier to assign
a returning or non-returning label to an initiating trust
link. We use Support Vector Machine (SVM) classi-
fiers in this study. We represent each initiating trust
link by a vector of feature values. The features involved
can be grouped into (a) topological features; (b) user
reciprocity features; and (c) reciprocity related user be-
havior features. These features are shown in Table 6.
The topological features are a set of coefficients de-
fined using different types of common neighbors between
trustor ui and trustee uj of an initiating trust link and
the coefficients include common neighbor count, Jac-
card coefficient, Adar/Adamic coefficient, and Prefer-
ential Attachment coefficient. For a user ui, we de-
fine Γin(ui) and Γout(ui) as the set of trustors and set
of trustees of ui respectively. We also define Γ(ui) =
Γin(ui) ∪ Γout(ui) as the set of trustors and trustees of
ui.
The user reciprocity features include the user re-
ciprocities of the trustor and trustee of the initiating
link, and the UserReciprocityRank score. The reci-
procity related behavior features include initiating and
successful seeking behavior values of ui, attracting and
returning behavior values of uj , as well as the different
scores of BasicRank, DelayRank and Reputation-
Rank.
7 Experiments and Results
7.1 Experiment Setup We would like to evaluate
the performances of different ranking and classification
methods using our proposed behavior models on pre-
dicting whether there exists a returning link given an
initiating link. From time point 1 to 938, there are
171,779 initiating links and 19,852 returning links for
these initiating links. In general, the network grows over
time with new nodes as well as edges added. Thus, it is
not reasonable to measure the behaviors of a new user
who just joins the system and does not leave enough
evidence to express his/her behaviors. Hence, we only
include an initiating link (ui, uj) created at time z in
our prediction task if both ui and uj have at least dmin
out-links and dmin in-links created during [1, z).
There are two sets of experiments conducted for the
reciprocal trust prediction task:
• Prediction of returning link during [z, 938]: This
experiment predicts the returning link formed any-
time between the creation of initiating link at time
z and last time point in our dataset, i.e., 938. This
variant of prediction does not care about how soon
after the initiating link the returning link will be
created.
• Prediction of returning link during [z, z + ∆zmax]
where ∆zmax: In some applications, one may be in-
terested in returning links formed soon after the ini-
tiating links. We therefore introduce ∆zmax as the
delay threshold to include only returning links
created at most ∆zmax days after the initiating
link. This reduces the number of returning links
to be predicted making the prediction task more
challenging.
In the second set of experiments, we vary ∆zmax from 5
to 50. For simplicity, we say the first set of experiments
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Table 6: Features of Initiating Trust Link from ui to uj
Features Description
Topological Features
Common in-in-neighbors |Γin(ui) ∩ Γin(uj)|
Common out-out-neighbors |Γout(ui) ∩ Γout(uj)|
Common neighbors |Γ(ui) ∩ Γ(uj)|
Common out-in neighbors |Γout(ui) ∩ Γin(uj)|
Common in-out neighbors |Γin(ui) ∩ Γout(uj)|
JCa of in-in-neighbors
|Γin(ui)∩Γin(uj)|
|Γin(ui)∪Γin(uj)|
JC of out-out-neighbors
|Γout(ui)∩Γout(uj)|
|Γout(ui)∪Γout(uj)|
JC of neighbors
|Γ(ui)∩Γ(uj)|
|Γ(ui)∪Γ(uj)|
JC of out-in neighbors
|Γout(ui)∩Γin(uj)|
|Γout(ui)∪Γin(uj)|
JC of in-out neighbors
|Γin(ui)∩Γout(uj)|
|Γin(ui)∪Γout(uj)|
AAb of in-in-neighbors
∑
uk ∈ Γin(ui)∩
Γin(uj)
1
log(|Γ(uk)|)
AA of out-out-neighbors
∑
uk ∈ Γout(ui)∩
Γout(uj)
1
log(|Γ(uk)|)
AA of neighbors
∑
uk∈Γ(ui)∩Γ(uj)
1
log(|Γ(uk)|)
AA of out-in neighbors
∑
uk ∈ Γout(ui)∩
Γin(uj)
1
log(|Γ(uk)|)
AA of in-out neighbors
∑
uk ∈ Γin(ui)∩
Γout(uj)
1
log(|Γ(uk)|)
PAc of in-in-neighbors |Γin(ui)| · |Γin(uj)|
PA of out-out-neighbors |Γout(ui)| · |Γout(uj)|
PA of neighbors |Γ(ui)| · |Γ(uj)|
PA of out-int neighbors |Γout(ui)| · |Γin(uj)|
PA of in-out neighbors |Γin(ui)| · |Γout(uj)|
User Reciprocity Features
User reciprocity of ui rui
User reciprocity of uj ruj
UserReciprocityRank Score scoreu(i, j)
Reciprocity Related User Behavior Features
Initiating behaviors of ui Ii/I
d
i /I
r
i
Attracting behaviors of uj Aj/A
d
j /A
r
j
Successful seeking behavior Si/S
d
i /S
r
i
of ui
Returning behaviors Rj/R
d
j /R
r
j
of uj
BasicRank Score scores(i, j)
DelayRank Score scored(i, j)
ReputationRank Score scorer(i, j)
aJaccard Coefficient.
bAdamic/Adar coefficient.
cPreferential attachment coefficient
has ∆zmax =∞.
7.2 Evaluation Measurement To evaluate the per-
formances of different ranking and classification meth-
ods for reciprocal trust prediction, we use F1 and AUC
PRC (Area under Precision Recall Curve). Suppose
there are N initiating links to be predicted, out of which
Nr have returning links. We rank N initiating links in
descending order in terms of its returning score gener-
ated by each ranking/classification method. For SVM
based methods, SVM-light [5] is used and we use 5-fold
validation to train and test on initiating links. The pre-
cision, recall and F1 measure of these predicted results
are identical and defined as:
F1 =
# returning links among top Nr ranked initiating links
Nr
In addition, we also use AUC PRC[1] which mea-
sures the area under the Precision-Recall curve as a per-
formance metric. An important disadvantage when us-
ing F1 is that F1 only examines a subset of top initiating
links with highest scores which might be the easiest ones
to predict. This disadvantage might lead to bias results
when comparing the performances of different methods.
In contrast, AUC PRC looks at an algorithm’s overall
performance to rank all the links. The F1 of a Random
predictor is expected to be NrN .
7.3 Overall Results We want to examine the over-
all prediction accuracies of our proposed methods with
other baseline methods. Our proposed methods to
be evaluated include: (a) Ranking based methods:
BasicRank, DelayRank, ReputationRank and
UserReciprocityRank; and (b) Classification based
methods: SVMTopology, SVMBasic, SVMDe-
layRank, SVMUserReciprocity, and SVMAll.
The baseline methods to be compared with are 20
ranking methods each using a topological feature in Ta-
ble 6. For each of these baseline methods, the fea-
ture value is used as score(i, j) for ranking initiating
links. For example, the Common in-in-neighbors rank-
ing model will give an initiating link from ui to uj a
score of score(i, j) = |Γin(ui)∩Γin(uj)| as the likelihood
that uj will return a trust link to ui at a later time. Sev-
eral of these baseline methods have been found effective
in link prediction research [6]. Finally, we also include
a Random prediction method that randomly predicts
initiating links to have returning links.
Performance of Baseline Ranking Methods We
first examine the performance of our 20 baseline ranking
methods using topological features and the random
baseline method, for predicting returning links. In
addition to ∆zmax = ∞, we use ∆zmax = 5 so as
to predict returning links within 5 days from the time
the corresponding initiating links are created. We
use dmin = 5 so that the behavior models compute
reciprocity related behaviors based on at least 5 in-links
and 5 out-links before one user initiates link to another
user. This dmin setting confines our prediction task to
57, 579 initiating links. The numbers of returning links
based on the two ∆zmax settings are 19,852 and 11,798
respectively.
The baseline results for both ∆zmax = ∞ and
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Figure 7: Performance of baseline ranking methods
(dmin = 5 and ∆zmax =∞)
∆zmax = 5 cases are shown in Figures 7 and 8 respec-
tively. For ∆zmax =∞, we observe that Adamic/Adar
coefficient (AA) of in-out-neighbors outperforms other
baseline methods both in AUC PRC and F1. The AUC
PRC and F1 of this topological baseline ranking method
are more than 50% improvement over those of random
baseline. The performance of common in-out-neighbor
and JC in-out-neighbor methods are just slightly lower
than AA-in-out-neighbors.
The above results are reasonable since the more
users who are both the trustors of user ui initiating a
link and trustees of user uj receiving the link, the more
likely uj returns a link back to ui. We also observe that
in-out-neighbor type methods generally outperform the
in-in-neighbor type methods which in turns outperform
the out-out-neighbor and neighbor type methods. The
out-in-neighbor methods yield the worst performance.
In fact, the methods using preferential attachment (PA)
coefficient of out-out-neighbors, neighbors, and out-in-
neighbors have performed worse than random.
The results for ∆zmax = 5 are similar except that
the AUC PRC and F1 values are lower for all methods
since the task is harder. AA-in-out-neighbor remains
to be the best among the baseline methods. As AA-
in-out-neighbor baseline ranking method gives the best
performance, we will only include it for subsequent
performance evaluation.
Performance of Proposed Ranking and Classi-
fication Methods We now examine the performance
of our proposed ranking and classification methods
for ∆zmax = ∞ in Figure 9. We fix dmin = 5
in these experiments. Among the ranking methods,
DelayRank yields the best performance and is very
closely followed by BasicRank and Reputation-
Rank. UserReciprocityRank, on the other hand,
performs only slightly better than the best baseline,
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Figure 8: Performance of baseline ranking methods
(dmin = 5 and ∆zmax = 5)
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Figure 9: Performance of proposed ranking and classi-
fication methods (dmin = 5 and ∆zmax =∞)
AA-in-out-neighbor. Interestingly, SVM using all topo-
logical features performs no better than DelayRank,
BasicRank and ReputationRank which are non-
supervised methods. When all features are included,
SVM-All outperforms all ranking methods. The above
observations are also found in the case of ∆zmax = 5 as
shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Performance of proposed ranking and classi-
fication methods (dmin = 5 and ∆zmax = 5)
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Table 7: Number of initiating and returning links by
varying dmin.
dmin # initiating # return- % # return- %
links ing links ing links
(∆zmax =∞) (∆zmax = 5)
0 171, 779 34, 910 20.3 20, 962 12.2
5 57, 579 19, 852 34.5 11, 798 20.5
10 39, 617 15, 100 38.1 8, 967 22.6
15 29, 593 12, 042 40.7 7, 175 24.2
20 22, 664 9, 817 43.3 5, 859 25.9
25 18, 032 8, 033 44.5 4, 802 26.6
30 14, 461 6, 589 45.6 3, 981 27.5
35 11, 646 5, 457 46.9 3, 336 28.7
40 9, 585 4, 570 47.7 2, 804 29.3
45 7, 894 3, 805 48.2 2, 360 29.9
50 6, 410 3, 134 48.9 1, 958 30.6
7.4 Results by varying dmin We now focus on
evaluating performances for different dmin values, i.e.,
dmin ∈ {5, 10, · · · , 50} for both ∆zmax = ∞ and
∆zmax = 5. The number of initiating and returning
links with different dmin values are shown in Table 7.
As shown, the larger the value of dmin the higher the
percentage of returning links, implying that we are more
likely to find returning links among more serious and
experienced users (given their higher number of in- and
out-links).
Instead of showing the performances of all methods,
we only include the representative methods from base-
line ranking, our proposed reciprocity behavior based
ranking, and classification approaches. They are AA-
in-out-neighbor, DelayRank and SVM-All. Figures 11
and 12 show the performances of these 3 methods for
different dmin’s for ∆zmax =∞ and 5. From the figures,
we observe that the performances of the 3 methods are
not very much affected by dmin. The relative order by
performance of SVM-All, DelayRank and AA-in-out-
neighbor remains unchanged.
7.5 Performances with different ∆zmax So far,
we have tried ∆zmax = 5 other than ∆zmax = ∞. We
thus evaluate the performance of the three representa-
tive methods for ∆zmax ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, 50} while
fixing dmin = 5. With different ∆zmax values, we have
different numbers of returning links as shown in Table 8.
As shown in Figures 13(a) and (b), AA-in-out-
neighbor, DelayRank and SVMAll improve in AUC
PRC and F1 slightly as ∆zmax increases. In practical
applications, we know that ∆zmax is expected to be
small, say < 10. In this range, both SVMAll and
DelayRank outperform AA-in-out-neighbor by wide
margin.
Table 8: Number of returning links for different ∆zmax’s
(dmin = 5).
∆zmax # returning links % returning links
1 8, 716 43.9
2 9, 960 50.2
3 10, 761 54.2
4 11, 383 57.3
5 11, 798 59.4
10 13, 150 66.2
20 14, 602 73.6
50 16, 395 82.6
∞ 19, 852 100
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Figure 13: Performances with different ∆zmax’s
(dmin = 5)
8 Conclusion
This paper studies the trust reciprocity behaviors within
an online review user community, and deploys them in
solving reciprocal trust prediction problem. Built upon
the existing work on network level link reciprocity mea-
sures, we develop node level user reciprocity measure
and a number of new measures for trust reciprocity
related behaviors, namely trust initiating, returning,
successful seeking, and attracting. We make observa-
tions about these behavior measures in an Epinions
dataset. These measures have been further used in sev-
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Figure 12: Performances with different values of dmin (∆zmax = 5)
eral ranking (non-supervised) and classification (super-
vised) methods to address the reciprocal trust link pre-
diction problem effectively. This paper represents an
early data mining work on trust reciprocity, a relatively
novel research topic. There are several interesting di-
rections for the future work. In particular, link reci-
procity exists in many different network data. It is use-
ful to evaluate reciprocity related behaviors and recip-
rocal link formation in other large networks that record
link creation timestamps. To create network models
that resemble real life networks, one may incorporate
reciprocity related behaviors of users and the effect of
reciprocal links.
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